Florida Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 4

Article 1

March 1963

"After All, Doctors are Human"
Leonard S. Powers

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Leonard S. Powers, "After All, Doctors are Human", 15 Fla. L. Rev. 463 (1963).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Powers: "After All, Doctors are Human"

University of Florida Law Review
VOL. XV

SPRING 1963

No. 4

"AFTER ALL, DOCTORS ARE HUMAN"*
LEONARD S. POWERS'"

Why is it necessary to remind those who read the opinions of the
Supreme Court of Florida that "after all, doctors are human"? Does
the legal profession entertain so much doubt about this matter that
such reminders are appropriate? The particular case in which this
statement appears supports the proposition that medical witnesses
can make mistakes, but one could conclude that the learned justice
issued the reminder to the bar in order to rebut what he feared might
otherwise be presumed. Fortunately for the legal profession, physicians do not regularly publish opinions evaluating the activities of
lawyers, but it is no secret that if they did many thick legal skins
would finally be pierced, and there might be no generous reminders
that lawyers are people too. What are the sources of this mutual misunderstanding?
There is an obvious and regrettable conflict between the professions of law and medicine. The organized professions are engaged
in efforts to reduce this conflict through joint committees and interprofessional codes,' but these efforts are more palliatives than cures.
The basic causes of conflict must be identified and understood. The
professions have been concentrating with some success 2 on eliminating
the everyday irritations that arise between lawyers and doctors, but,
while this is a most laudable objective, the surface irritations are
largely effects rather than causes. To reach the heart of the conflict,
one must dig deeper.

*United States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d 741, 745 (Fla. 1951)
(Hobson, J.).
90A.B. 1940, Duke University; J.D. 1950, University of North Carolina; LL.M.
1956, Duke University; Professor of Law, University of Florida; Chairman of the
Committee on Law and Medicine of the Association of American Law Schools.
The author has initiated a law-medicine program at the University of Florida
which has required close cooperation with the faculty of the College of Medicine.
I. National Interprofessional Code for Physicians and Attorneys (1958); Hartshorne, A Contribution to Public Welfare: The National Interprofessional Code,
45 A.B.A.J. 31 (1959); Standards of Practice for Doctors and Lawyers, 33 N.Y.S.B.J.
364 (1961); Principles for Cooperation: Medico-Legal Guide, 35 CONN. B.J. 353
(1961); Stetler, Current Developments in Medicolegal Fields, 10 VA. L. WEEKLY
DICTA CoMP. 13 (1959).
2. Wishart, Inter-Professional Relationship, 34 Wis. B. Bull. Oct. 1961, p. 16.
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Poor communication is one obvious source of misunderstanding.
Each profession has a highly technical language that, along with its
standard dictionaries, is largely unknown to the other. Technical
terminology is needed in each profession in order to attain accuracy
and certainty of meaning. Yet, the very thing that facilitates understanding within each profession serves to block understanding between
the professions. Interprofessional communication was probably better
when students were compelled to study Latin and Greek at some stage
of their education. Even a slight exposure to these languages aided
in understanding many medical and legal terms. Poor communication between the two professions is not, however, a fundamental cause
of conflict. It is an aggravating factor. That human beings who are
unable to communicate satisfactorily will have an increased potential
for conflict was fully appreciated when the eleventh chapter of Genesis was written. This knowledge is not new, nor is it peculiar to law
and medicine.
In the same class with the communication difficulty is the increasing specialization within the professions. In order to discover all
there is to know, knowledge has been compartmentalized so that the
expert is one who knows more and more about less and less. The
result in law and medicine is a sort of professional myopia. Some
lawyers spend a professional lifetime on tax problems or land titles;
some doctors specialize in a single organ system. The result is to
exacerbate a condition that has existed since law and medicine became
separate disciplines. Osler observed nearly fifty years ago that "the
extraordinary development of modern science may be her undoing.
Specialism ... has fragmented the specialties themselves in a way that

makes the outlook hazardous. The workers lose all sense of proportion in a maze of minutiae." 3 The intense preoccupation with smaller
and smaller areas of professional knowledge has a dehumanizing
effect as well as a blinding one. Proliferating specialization has obscured the great truths revealed by other disciplines, and the most
important for law is medicine and for medicine, law. The fragmentation of learning has played a part in the loss of rapport among all
disciplines, and this loss is most evident in the law-medicine conflict.
But, again, specialization is probably an aggravating factor rather
than a basic cause of discord.
Mention has already been made of the many surface irritations
that have emerged in this era of bad feeling. The doctor feels abused
in fulfilling his role as an expert witness. The hours he spends in
testifying or waiting to testify at the courthouse keep him from his
patients. The doctor may feel that the lawyer has not been as
3.

OSLER,

The Old Humanities and the New Science, in A WAY OF LIFE AND
OF SIR WILLIAM OSLER 27 (Dover ed. 1958).
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mindful of the former's fees as the latter's. It is a lawyer that has
embarrassed the doctor on cross-examination. Treated with reverential deference in his own domain, the doctor understandably resents being represented as an ignoramus or worse in the courtroom.
A lawyer represented the patient that sued the doctor for alleged
medical malpractice. The lawyer also has complaints: who becomes
unavailable as a witness and wrecks a client's case that the lawyer
has spent months preparing for trial; who refuses to testify for the
plaintiff against a defendant physician in a medical malpractice case;
who declines to testify in language jurors can understand; who changes
his expert opinion without warning when confronted with medical
texts that differ with him; who equivocates and qualifies when asked
about causation? Why, it's the same fellow that submits the exorbitant bills for expert medical services! Again, these are more symptoms than causes. Were the misunderstandings not more basic, these
irritations would probably not be the articulated grievances that they
now are. They are the surface manifestations of a durable and deeprooted conflict.
BASIC CAUSES OF CONFLICT

The basic causes of medicolegal conflict arise from differences in
subject matter and method. Concerning subject matter, the objective
of the medical profession is to prevent disease and heal the sick. The
objective of the legal profession is to secure order in society through
peaceful settlement of human disputes. Both professions deal with
pathological problems, but the physician deals with his patient's
problems with nature, while the lawyer deals with his client's problems with other human beings. The physician is not interested in
holding another accountable for some pecuniary loss or criminal act;
he wants to help his patient overcome disease. He is fighting microbes
and not other men. This difference in subject matter and objective
gives rise to different methods.
The doctor utilizes science to overcome the physical problems of
his patients; the lawyer seeks to settle the human disputes of his
clients with the law and its institutions. Doctor and lawyer may have
been closely related in primitive times and perhaps even united, but
that was long ago.4 The doctor and the lawyer have followed divergent paths over the intervening centuries. Science is a method and
not a collection of facts. Particularly with the advent of this method,
4. "There was a time when the medicine man and the lawgiver had much in
common. Both were men of mystery and magic, members of a sacerdotal class
in close communion with the gods. The early physician bent his efforts not to
curing disease, but to propitiating the gods and exorcising the evil spirits that
had taken possession of the unfortunate victim. The ancient lawgiver spoke with
the authority of divine sanction, and when the ruler-judge decided a dispute, the
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medicine began a development far different from that of law. Many
physicians prefer to be regarded as artisans rather than scientists in
dealing with the diseases of patients, but the empirical approach of
modern medicine fairly places it with science.
The early beginnings of science are not part of recent history. The
technique of accurate observation and of reaching conclusions simply
from experience was practiced by Hippocrates and was developed by
other imaginative minds even before the Rennaissance. Yet, the fall
of Rome was followed by a thousand years of stagnation, and organized scientific activity as known today had its origin less than five
hundred years ago. Francis Bacon was the father of the inductive
method and its application to natural phenomena. This method required recorded facts, new observations, and experimental results
to be collected and tabulated, so that the connections between phenomena and their resultant general laws would become manifest. The
value of this method to medicine was perceived, and modern, scientific medicine has emerged largely since 1800.
The problem of avoiding pain, sickness, and death had dominated
man's mind since prehistoric times, but he was limited by his ignorance and superstition. The development of the scientific method
breached this barrier. Modern science is very effective in revealing the
present facts of physical nature. The problem of human disease exists
in a context of present physical facts. Human disputes, by contrast,
exist in a context that is largely subjective and non-physical, and to
the extent that facts are involved they are past facts that once may
have existed but no more. 5
Law utilizes a method that is not nearly so precise and efficient as
modern science. The approach of the practicing lawyer is largely
deductive, whereas that of the practicing physician, as is true of all
modern scientists, is essentially inductive and experimental.6 Both
professions, however, use induction and deduction in varying degrees,
judgment was assumed to be the product of direct inspiration." GurMIACHER &
WVEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 3 (1952).
5. "The experimental method distinguishes science from all other forms of
inquiry, although it shares with them trial, error and chance success. This method
has not been applied successfully to all problems of science. It is especially
difficult to study the causes of past events which are unlike events that can be
made to occur in the present." INGLE, PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH IN BIOLOGY AND
MEDICINE 1-2 (1958). Psychiatry deals more with problems that are like those
found in the law than any other field of medicine. Psychiatry, like law, deals
with human problems that are largely nonphysical and subjective. It is not surprising that the scientific method has not been able to produce results in psychiatry
that are quite as impressive as it has in medicine that is dominated by present
physical facts. This is not to say that the results in psychiatry are not impressive
at all; the results are often dramatic.
6. The scientific method as dealt with herein may be described as a process
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so the difference is more complex than this deceptively simple explanation. The practicing lawyer uses deduction as his principal approach, but the practicing physician also searches his brains and his
books for medical principles he can apply to the problems of his
particular patient. The medical scientist engaged in research uses induction in arriving at his hypotheses, but so do the judge and legislator, at least to some extent. Some have contended that the case method
of study in law schools is an application of the inductive method. This
contention is less accepted now partly because it is dear that most
law students and some law teachers use casebook cases as sources for
the statement of legal rules rather than as data from which theories
may be constructed using the inductive method. Judges and legislators in using the inductive process usually stop where the scientist is
just beginning; it is almost impossible for even those lawyers engaged
in lawmaking to experiment sufficiently to confirm their hypotheses.
The very nature of the subject matter and objective of law impose
this limitation. There has been sharp disagreement about the extent
to which the methods of modern science can and should be adopted by
the law. 7
by which a theory is formulated by inductive reasoning from observation of experience or experiments. From theory, theorems emerge by deduction. The
theorem is refined into rules of correspondence or operational definitions, which
are then tested in experiments. From the observation of the experiments, the
process begins again, corrections being made in the theory to conform to the
observations. It is the experimental stage and the creating process of induction
based on it that is the hallmark of modem science.
7. BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW
BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1957); Llewellyn, Social Significance in Legal Problems,

in

CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY

OF MICHI-

LAW SCHOOL 8 (1955); Cavers, Science, Research, and the Law: Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 162 (1957); Frankfurter, The Conditions
for and the Aims and Methods of Legal Research, 6 Am. L. S. Rlv. 663 (1930);
Godfrey, Some Notions for a Regime of Woodshed Legal Research, 13 J. LEGAL ED.
1 (1960); Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL ED.
399 (1956); Patterson, Can Law be Scientific? 25 ILL. L. REV. 121 (1930); Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUMN. L. Rav. 605 (1908); Schwartz, Field Experinentation in Sociolegal Research, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 401 (1961). Particularly interesting are some observations by Professor Ernest M. Jones in a provocative article
recently published: Jones, Some Current Trends in Legal Research, 15 J. LEGAL
ED. 121 (1962). "Since 1960, the record of the law schools in nondoctrinal research
has shown improvement, primarily because foundations have begun to underwrite
such research. But looking back over the past, it seems to me that Professor Hurst
is quite correct in concluding that on the whole the record is still disappointing."
Id. at 134. "Although the road ahead for nondoctrinal research into legal phenomena is almost completely uncharted, there is reason to believe that in such
research lies our best hope of important contributions to the study of the legal
order. And the trends that have emerged since 1950 support the optimistic hope
that little by little, something appropriate to the name 'science of law' can be
developed." Id. at 138.
GAN
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The scientist can repeat experiments in his laboratory. The factual
milieu of a typical legal problem exists only once, and the lawyer
is seldom present to observe it. It is past history when he enters the
scene. Not even the lawmakers make much use of experimentation.
Of course, a statute or legal rule might be amended or repealed after
years of application have revealed its defects, but the "experiments"
are sporadic, unplanned, and poorly observed. This is the scientific
method only by the roughest analogy. It is true that lawyers help
judges see that old cases should be overruled or the rules they contain
modified, but if this is participation by attorneys in inductive reasoning it is most certainly minimal and haphazard. Science helps
very little in making the value judgments lawmaking entails.
The autopsy is a good example of the scientific method applied to
medicine. A pathologist examines every organ of the body regardless
of the suspected cause of death. The autopsy report is then studied
in relation to the clinical history. The medical profession has learned
much through this inductive approach. The practicing lawyer certainly does not utilize such an approach. The law tells him what facts
are determinative in a legal problem so these are the facts for which
he looks. He doesn't look at everything.
Some law teachers are now engaged in considerable experimentation, and if reports of their findings have an appreciable impact on
legislation and the course of judicial decision, law will become more
scientific. Significant progress in this direction has been slow, though
it has been suggested that the Constitution of the United States is, in
a sense, a product of the scientific method. The suggestion is that the
comparative study of governments of the world by the founding
fathers resulted in the formulation of new hypotheses that are stated
in the Constitution. 8
The lawyer's partisan role also thwarts any inclination he may have
to utilize a scientific approach. The scientist can retain considerable
objectivity by remaining outside the subject matter he is observing
while he tests his hypotheses. Once the lawyer is involved, he is part
of the very subject matter with which he works and is in a poor
position to practice objectivity, especially since the adversary method
requires him to be partisan.
Then after the law reaches a result, there is no precise language
nor system of symbols in which to express it. Some work has been
done on this problem and some possible solutions proposed," but most
lawyers and law books still use orthodox language and words. Examples of a word or words of legal significance having different meanings
Pope, The Unfolding Unity, 3 J. PUB. L. 322-3 (1954).
KOCOURFK, JURAL RELATIONS (2d ed. 1928); Allen, Symbolic Logic: A RazoyEdged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal Documents, 66 YALE L. J. 833
(1957); Tammelo, Sketch for a Symbolic Juristic Logic, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 277 (1956).
8.

9.
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to different lawyers and judges or different meanings at different
times are commonplace. By contrast, 3.1416 has an abiding property
that is reassuring to one shaken by the uncertainties of the legal
world.
The lawyer does not elect to use a method that is so different from
that of the medical scientist. Rather, the subject matter with which
he deals does not now permit any appreciable adaptation of the
scientific method.O Men of law utilize both inductive and deductive
reasoning, indeed, every intelligent person does," but this does not
mean the full scientific method as it has been employed in natural
science and, to some extent, in applied sciences such as medicine.
Successful experiments upon society have been few. The very nature
of the subject matter makes this so. Experimentation requires control over the variables, and the legal scholar does not possess sufficient
control over society and its host of variables.
Law was invented to deal with human disputes. Law is the
alternative to settlement of disputes by force. Civilization is impossible without law; all is anarchy and confusion without it. Thomas
Hobbes suggested that men create and abide by law not because they
like it, but because life without law is even more intolerable. Law
provides rules that are designed to achieve tolerable solutions of
human disputes so that peace may be preserved. Most persons observe these rules thus avoiding altogether many potential disputes.
Obviously, since persons concerned professionally with the law must
know about these rules, the natural approach of the typical lawyer
is more likely to be deductive than inductive.
Solving man's disputes with these rules is not at all like curing his
diseases. Typically, a lawyer deals with more unpredictable variables.
One of these variable factors is another perverse human being who is
opposed to his client rather than microbes, trauma, and congenital
defects, which, after all, are impersonal. Further, this antagonistic
human being also has a lawyer.
So having vastly different problems to solve, doctors and lawyers
use vastly different methods. When a physician is confronted with
a sick patient he has an elaborate diagnostic procedure which may
identify the disease. Diagnosis is the determination of a disease from
its symptoms and signs. Symptoms are subjective and are related to
the physician by the patient. Signs are objective and are discovered
during the physical examination. These are supplemented by special
diagnostic methods such as laboratory, pathological, and X-ray studies.
The symptoms are described by the patient in the course of history
taking, which is very much like the first interview of the lawyer with
his client, but this initial similarity in method soon ends.
10.
11.

Bridgman, The Prospect for Intelligence, 34
HuxLEY, DARWINIANA 358-75 (1896).
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Even if the difficulty of the patient cannot be determined immediately, the procedure of differential diagnosis marks a fairly
clear path for the physician to follow. Generally, it means that he
studies the basic symptoms and laboratory findings and from this
he can narrow the major disease possibilities. He begins treatment
based on this differential diagnosis. If the patient's symptoms are not
relieved the initial diagnosis is modified. Diagnosis and treatment
move along together, each reacting on the other. When the disease is
finally established, the indicated treatment (if there is one) is usually
beyond dispute. In this diagnosis-treatment process, the physician in
charge ultimately decides the facts and determines the treatment. It
attending and consulting physicians disagree, la)men seldom learn of
it. No adversary insists on full disclosure. The physician in charge
decides the purely medical issues unilaterally. This is not to say that
consulting specialists and the patient himself do not greatly affect the
decisions that are made; the point is that the physician and his consultants engage in a process of decision-making that does not involve
any disclosed adversary aspect.
If a medical decision proves erroneous, the patient may die, but
the case is not then sent to some higher court where the death may
be reversed and a new operation ordered. It is finished. The medical
method is unilateral, and the physician (and those he may consult) is
judge, jury, and supreme court all in one. An error by a physician
may have some significance in a human dispute called medical malpractice, but this is legal subject matter, the medical issues having
already been decided unilaterally.
Another striking difference in the medical decision-making process
is the absence of lay participation. Of course, the patient is usually
a layman, but then he has an interest in the matter which certainly
distinguishes him from the law's impartial jury of laymen. Also, the
participation of the patient in making decisions concerning the diagnosis and treatment of his condition is itself quite different from the
law's adversary system in which neither the client nor his lawyer
has a role in the actual decision-making by judge and jury.
With a legal dispute, by contrast, the facts and what to do about
them are decided by a court trial. The method is adversary. Even
though legal advice may be given or a dispute settled without a court
trial ever taking place, these things are done by lawyers in the light
of what would likely happen should the "fish bowl" of the courtroom
be entered. Even the drafting of a will or a simple letter connected
with the negotiation of a contract is conditioned by the possibility of
litigation. Indeed, that is the reason the client engaged a lawyer in
the first place. Much of the lawyer's work today is remedial or preventive, but this does not diminish the importance of the adversary
trial which hangs over the legal heads of all. Legal advice involves a
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prophecy as to how a judge and jury would solve the dispute. The
lawyer advises action according to legal rules he has learned; from
what else can he prophesy? The method is deductive.
A lawyer's professional prophecy closely resembles medical diagnosis. There is art and science in both law and medicine. The physician cannot always be sure of the diagnosis, of the prescribed treatment, and of the outcome. He must often do a substantial amount
of guessing in all three respects, but his educated guesses are better
than the layman's. This is also true of the lawyer's diagnosis of legal
problems, of his determination of what course to follow, and of his
prediction of the legal outcome. Here, the resemblance ceases. Unilateral determination is deemed appropriate by society in medicine
because natural forces render the final judgment on a problem of
disease, but the adversary system is required when the law is being
applied to a human dispute because human beings make the ultimate
decision. Law is not part of nature. The solutions of the law are, in
a sense, artificial rather than natural. This has led society to provide
a rigorous system of checks and balances in the adjudicative process:
attorneys, judge, jury, and appellate courts to correct mistakes made
in lower courts. The adversary character of the process is simply to
assure that nothing relevant and important will be overlooked by the
human beings that resolve the dispute. Obviously, the subject matter
of the law has led society to a different method, a different approach,
and it is not surprising to find that such radical differences provide a
fertile field for misunderstandings.
The development of medical science and method has resulted in the
surprising spectacle of life and death problems being dealt with in a
unilateral manner, while legal problems, largely matters of the pocketbook, are subjected to the community judgment of the courtroom
with its lawyers, judge, jury, and appellate courts. The legal method
is democratic, but, like most democratic methods, it takes a lot of
time. Medical treatment cannot depend upon such a method. Time is
a vital factor in medicine. There is no similar urgency with legal
problems because the critical period is usually past, and no one is
dying or suffering. The event that produced the dispute is usually in
the past and terminated. New events are not still happening and old
facts are not changing as in the typical medical case.
The adversary method requires the lawyer for each side to take
a highly partisan approach, doing everything he can, short of fraud
and corruption, to advance his client's case and to damage that of his
adversary. This is the reason counsel must cross-examine adverse
medical witnesses with vigor and tenacity; it is not because the lawyer
is rude, crude, and mean, as some medical witnesses think, but then
lawyers have not taken the time to explain their method to most
physicians. This illustrates how difference in basic methods sets the
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stage for one of the surface irritations between the professions most
frequently and heatedly exhibited.
Obviously, this adversary method is unknown to medicine. It is
difficult to conceive of two physicians working as adversaries with a
patient. Certainly, the patient would not favor such an approach.
Medical men work together in a spirit of cooperation, not adversity.
The simple explanation for the difference in methods is that medical
truth is best discovered by the method of medicine, while legal truth
is best discovered by the legal method. Interprofessional relations
should improve when each profession appreciates that both methods
are aimed at the discovery of truth.
Most physicians get a good laugh from an explanation of the adversary system. "What an idiotic way to go about finding the truthl" 12
They feel that everyone should get on the same side and, shoulder to
shoulder, attack the citadels of ignorance as men of science do. The
adversary system does deserve serious criticism. For one thing, it does
not always disclose the actual truth of a dispute, and this would
be a fatal flaw were medicine involved rather than law. The answer is
that the real truth of a human dispute cannot be known; no known
method will reveal it. As far as society is concerned, the final judgment in a court trial establishes the official truth. The official truth
embodied in verdict and judgment may not be the real truth, but
it usually settles the dispute without bloodshed and maintains the
peace. The peaceful settlement of disputes is a fundamental objective; it may be more important in creating and maintaining the law
and its institutions than the objective of attaining justice between
the parties. Of course, the nearer final judgment comes to ascertaining truth and to attaining justice, the more likely that the losing
party will accept it and the dispute be ended. The two objectives
are not unrelated.
The physician, along with other scientists, is quite critical of the
lawyer for being satisfied with something less than truth. This indicates to him a lack of intellectual honesty in the lawyer, a general lack
12. A prominent neurosurgeon recently made the following observation in a
speech at a national meeting of surgeons: 'If truth was all that was sought, there
would be no need for lawyers at all .... The opposing lawyer is in court for
the sole purpose of making money .... ." Redden, Improving Medicolegal Relations, 10 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMP. 1, 2 (1959). Almost as startling is the statement of a recent President of the American Medical Association that "the law department of the American Medical Association reports that a recent study shows
the vast majority of all professional liability claims and suits are not justly
founded." Orr, Doctors and Lawyers: Physical and Civic Well-Being, 45 A.B.A.J.
1030, 1031 (1959). Has the A.M.A. discovered a more accurate method for making
such a determination than the courts which decide such cases? After all, the
"just founding" of malpractice claims is an issue in all such suits, and the
judges customarily decide this issue in ruling on motions for dismissal, directed
verdict, and summary judgment.
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of which he suspected anyway. He wishes lawyers would adopt the
methodology that medical science has found so useful.
The law is only partially utilizing the assistance of science, and
even this fragmentary adoption is superimposed on the adversary
method. Again, the subject matter of the law is accountable. Law
has made judicial solution of human disputes through legal rules depend on the state of mind of the parties involved. This is not the
mental condition at the time of adjudication, but the state of mind
that existed at the time of the origin of the dispute. A homicide will
be first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, or no
crime at all depending on the state of mind of the person doing the
killing. Negligence cases, including medical malpractice, hinge on
whether the defendant exercised due care at an earlier time. Will
contests often hinge on the intent of a deceased person. Any lawyer
drafting a legal instrument, be it a constitution or a simple contract,
takes as his guiding principle the expression of the intent of the parties
to the instrument. Crimes and torts are defined by law in terms of act
and mental state, but there is usually very little dispute about the
act. It either happened or it didn't, and the law has developed
procedures for determining which witnesses are lying about an event.
From its very inception, however, it was realized that the law must
take into account the intent with which an act is done, for obviously
not all killings are murder nor are very many unsuccessful surgical
operations the result of a careless mind. So rules of law usually contain a requirement as to the mental state of the human being involved.
The adversary system is the most precise method yet discovered for
determining such intangible mental elements of the past. Perhaps the
future may find science developing some sort of ingenious, electronic
device, which will assimilate the law and evidence and then flash a
verdict; but even if science should develop such a mechanized court,
two lawyers may still be required to supply the law and evidence for
each party in order that both parties may have the benefit of all that
is favorable.
Law and its institutions have been aided immensely by scientific
evidence such as blood tests for intoxication and nonpaternity, fingerprint evidence for identification, radiology, electroencephalography,
narcoanalysis, the autopsy, and all the other reasons for which physicians are increasingly called to the courtroom. Their necessary
presence there has been the occasion for much of the conflict that is
the subject of this article. Medical science is influencing the law
and its method by this association, and it has made the trial a more
reliable method for discovering truth. This is a hopeful development,
and law and society are indebted, but the fundamental adversary
character of the trial has not changed. There will be an adversary
trial as long as someone must decide which experts and which scientific

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 1
17-1

UNI VERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW"

tests are truthful. When men of science reach the point that they
can determine conclusively what the truth is or was about a dispute,
including the past mental states of the parties, then the operating
room or examining room can take the place of the courtroom, and
no one will ever again be summoned for jury duty. Not many
persons, including physicians, would be willing to entrust their lives
and fortunes to conclusive adjudication by scientific devices thus far
developed, and this is doubly true if the determination were to be
made unilaterally without testing in the fires of an adversary procedure of some type. Yet, undoubtedly, medical issues of a life and
death nature are decided unilaterally by physicians, and naturally the
physician does not feel at home in the courtroom where he is forced
to abandon his usual authoritative role. Society has been conditioned
to accept this ex parte or unilateral method within the context of
problems arising in the physical world, but when a human dispute
arises society looks to the law and the adversary method for adjudication and decision.
Actions for medical malpractice provide the most striking illustration of medicolegal metamorphosis. Once the problem is shifted from
the here and now of present medical diagnosis and treatment so that
it becomes a question of what the physician should have done and
what was in his mind in the past, then the matter is referred to the
law and its method.
The method of science will not soon displace the adversary method
of the law. A completely reliable polygraph would provoke great
changes, but today's lie detector evidence is not usually admissible in
court unless both parties agree.13 Even its developers admit its lack
of reliability. It may be in this direction, however, that science may
ultimately do the most to improve the quest of the law for truth.
The physician feels not only that the adversary method is lacking
in scientific accuracy in arriving at the truth, but he also feels (I)
that the system gives undue advantage to the side with the better
lawyer, and (2) that it encourages lawyers to "tell lies for money."
These are typical reactions of laymen to the law and lawyers, but
the medical profession may be more sensitive to these old complaints
because its members are involved in more legal disputes than most
laymen. The first reaction has some substance in fact, but seems to
be largely an inherent defect of the adversary method that cannot be
completely eliminated. The second reaction arises from a misconception of the role of the lawyer in the adversary system and a lack
of understanding of the ethical requirements of the legal profession.
A lawyer may decline employment, but, having accepted it, he must
support the position of his client. A lawyer that usurps the function
13.

MCCORMICK, EvIDFNCF §174 (1954).
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of the court and decides which party is to be successful should be
disciplined. These defects and criticisms do not bother the lawyer
much. He accepts the adversary system for what it is: a deficient
and defective method, but the best that society has for dealing with
human disputes. This acceptance starts in law school where students
are conditioned to accept it just as medical students are trained to
accept the post-mortem examination, also very shocking to laymen
(including lawyers).
The physician feels that the lawyer is neither interested nor engaged in a search for truth but only in placing blame.'- Most of
this lack of understanding can be traced to the difference in basic
methods, which in turn are greatly influenced by the differences in
subject matter and objectives. These differences also produce the
great differences in environments: the medical school and hospital on
the one hand and the law school and courtroom on the other.
It is interesting to speculate how physicians would solve human
disputes should they be given such a function. Even medical scientists
would need some sort of adjudicatory device to resolve a dispute in
which the parties and witnesses were in utter disagreement. Something like a trial and something like a court probably would result,
even though not staffed by the traditional cast in the sensitive roles.
But in all frankness, if men of law had to deal with issues of medical
diagnosis and treatment the methods of the law would be equally
unsuited.
SPECIFIC

AREAS OF DiscoRD

One situs of misunderstanding is causation. To a physician, problems of causation are comprehended by etiology, the science of causes
of disease. He is much concerned with all causes because effective
treatment may consist of removing or altering any causal factor. Much
of the training in medical schools and teaching hospitals is directed
toward inculcating a sensitive regard for all causes that may affect a
pathologic condition. Naturally, the physician is trained to give more
attention to those causes that are still operative for it is in dealing
with these that disease may be controlled. The trauma to which the
defendant subjected the plaintiff may have been an initiating cause
of the plaintiff's pathologic condition, but when the patient reaches
the doctor the latter can do little about the initiating cause; it has
already happened. To the physician, this is one cause to which he
need pay little attention because it is no longer operative. The physician can control the potential causes of further harm to the plaintiff such as bacteria, chemical imbalance, and dietary deficiencies, but
he can do nothing to erase the initial traumatic event caused by the
14.

CuRRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 3 (1960).
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tortious conduct of the defendant. The physician is concerned with
all causes, but normally he is not greatly concerned about a traumatic
invasion that has already occurred and spent itself. 15
The cause that concerns a lawyer in the typical personal injury
case is the traumatic invasion of the plaintiff's person by the defendant. The lawyer knows that, even though the tortfeasor is only one
of many causes of the diseased condition of the plaintiff, he may
be held liable for all the harm.16 If the trauma accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing condition, the defendant need pay only for the
acceleration or aggravation he causes and not for the total condition.
When there is no contributing pre-existing condition, however, the
defendant can be held pecuniarily liable for all the plaintiff's damages even though he was not the sole cause nor the principal cause.
The legal test is whether the defendant was one of the causes without
which the injury to the plaintiff would not have occurred; other
causes are immaterial. This shocks physicians; why should the defendant have to pay for all of the harm when so many other factors
contributed to the pathologic condition of the plaintiff? It seems
opposed to etiology. The answer is that it is not a question of medical
etiology. It is a political decision as to where society feels that a loss
should fall, whether on the innocent plaintiff or on the tortfeasor who,
though he alone did not cause the injury, at least was a substantial
factor in producing it. If the tortfeasor or his insurers cannot be made
to bear the loss, then it is quite likely that society will have to pa
in the form of tax-supported institutions, public welfare, and other
forms of public assistance.
The rule that a tortfeasor who is one of multiple causes may be
found liable for all the plaintiff's harm has long been part of the law.
The law requires the defendant to take the plaintiff as he finds him.
including all the bacteria, pre-existing diseases, and congenital defects. 1 7 Yet, the injustice felt by the medical witness is such that he
15.

Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in th(

Concept of Causation, 31 TEXAS L. Rrv. 630, 649 (1953).
16. PROSSER, TORTS §44 (1955).
17. Id. §48. Again, the theory is that money damages will be reduced bN the
jury proportionately to the pre-existing conditions, but there is no reduction foi
contemporaneous causes. This is also true of workmen's compensation. ManN
workmen's compensation laws provide that when a pre-existing disease is accel
crated or aggravated by an accident arising out of employment only the acceleration
or aggravation shall be compensable. FLA. STAT. §440.02 (19) (1961); Hampton N
Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Paper Prods. Div., 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
This apportionment of damages where there is acceleration or aggravation of
pre-existing conditions is in accord with the etiological training of physicians, but
it is important to recognize that this apportionment is done by the fact finder.
The judge does not take other causes into account in ruling on whether the
plaintiff has established a case for the jury. It may be that the average jury in
a typical personal injury case pays little attention to any judicial instructions to
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may equivocate when asked a question about causation. Perhaps his
concern springs from a feeling of identity with the defendant, since
the medical witness may think about being a defendant himself
in some future malpractice case. He feels alarm over a rule of causation that will stupidly cast all the pecuniary loss on a defendant for
something that was actually the result of many causes, as any fool can
plainly see. When the medical witness is asked if, in his opinion, the
encounter with the defendant caused the plaintiff's present condition,
he interprets the question as an inquiry concerning whether the conduct of the defendant was the sole cause. Since there is no one sole
cause of anything connected with the human body, his answer to that
question may be in the negative. He knows that pathologic conditions
in the human body have multiple causes, and he is very likely to testify accordingly on the witness stand. The sad thing is that the interrogating counsel does not mean to inquire about medical etiology. What
counsel really thinks he is asking is whether, in the opinion of the
medical witness, the trauma occasioned by the defendant is or might
have been a cause of the plaintiff's condition. The lawyer should
carefully phrase his questions on causation accordingly.
This results in much misunderstanding because no one has taken
the time to explain legal causation to the medical witness. He should
be cautioned to answer causation questions objectively and scientifically, regardless of where the "chips may fall." It should be explained that the legal test of causation is a political decision imbedded
in the law having little to do with medical etiology, and that it would
be just as indefensible to try to apply a legal principle to solve a
medical problem. The medical witness should be advised that his
dislike of a legal rule does not empower him to tamper with it by
giving false or evasive answers. Such careful explanations to medical
witnesses in advance would help eliminate embarrassing and unseemly wrangling in the courtroom, and much of the ostensible conflict between the testimony of different medical experts would disappear.
Doctors are usually shocked when legal causation is explained to
them. They seem to want to apportion the damages to the various
causes whether contemporaneous or pre-existing, holding the defendant liable for no more than is fairly attributable to him alone. Some
medical witnesses apparently feel that the defendant should not have
to pay anything substantial when the plaintiff had an arteriosclerotic
heart even before the traumatic incident and was more likely to have
serious coronary consequences than a normal person. This feeling
is based on the conviction that these consequences were likely to
reduce the monetary award in proportion to the pre-existing condition of the
plaintiff.
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occur sooner or later anyway. It also stems from the doctor's preoccupation with helping the patient overcome disease; he isn't interested in imposing pecuniary liability on some other person. He
wants to identify the causes that, if controlled, can result in healing.
These controllable causes do not emanate from solvent tortfeasors,
and physicians do not care. Lawyers and society certainly do. Bacteria and congenital defects may be causes, but they do not pay judgments. If a solvent tortfeasor cannot be required to pay for the pecuniary losses suffered by the plaintiff, the expense, including the
bills of physicians and hospitals, is going to be paid by others. Again,
this is a political problem having little to do with the etiology of
disease.
Looking at the matter from the doctor's standpoint, it does seem
a little harsh to make a bus company pay S100,000 for a death, when
all it did was to cause, through the negligence of its driver, a wreck
that produced a laceration on a passenger's body, which activated
bacteria already there, which in turn attacked lungs weakened by poor
diet and congenital deficiencies. Courts feel that, as between the innocent plaintiff and the negligent defendant, the plaintiff should not
have to bear the loss. None of the nonhuman causes can pay. Perhaps this will explain what is meant by labelling legal causation a
political problem. "Political" is not used in any narrow partisan sense:
it simply means that the rule on legal causation is a practical solution
based on pragmatic considerations, not on scientific etiology.
Another specific area of discord exists in regard to the legal concept of insanity and the medical concept of mental disease. The traditional legal rules for determining criminal responsibility under the
defense of insanity are known as the rules in M'Naghten's Case,i s the
"right from wrong" test. Briefly stated, the test is whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from wrong in respect to the
particular act charged. This test, often with some subsidiary rules,
has been the accepted test of legal insanity for more than a hundred
years in all but a few states. There are many obvious difficulties
with the test. Does the ability to distinguish between right and wrong
refer to legal or moral right and wrong? Should the test be applied
objectively or subjectively? Psychiatrists do not like to answer questions cast in terms of the M'Naghten rules because they feel that

such a moralistic test does not relate to mental disease, the area in
which their expertise lies. The defendant's capacity to make moral
judgments may or may not indicate mental disability. Durham v.
United States"9 indicates that some judges believe the psychiatrists are
18.

10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).

19. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). New Hampshire had long lollowed the
Durham approach. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871). The
Durham rule has been developed further in later decisions of the United States
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right. The Durham rule allows the psychiatrist to testify in terms of
mental disease without being required to answer questions on what
he may consider nonmedical matters such as "malice," "right and
wrong," and "criminal intent." Simply stated, the Durham rule is
that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect. The court that announced the new approach has acknowledged that one purpose of the
rule is to remove some of the communication barriers between lawyers and physicians.2 0 Vermont recently abolished the M'Naghten
rules and adopted by statute2-' a test much like that recommended by
the American Law Institute,2 2 which like the Durham rule brings
mental disease into the test for criminal responsibility.
Quite obviously, most lawyers and doctors are referring to different
things when they speak of insanity, and many psychiatrists do not
recognize the term at all. This happens because legal and medical
"insanity" differ in most jurisdictions. A detailed exploration into
the difficulties this disagreement has caused between the two professions is unnecessary here as there have been many law review
articles examining the opinion in the Durham case and re-examining
the M'Naghten rules. 23 The legal and medical professions have criti2
cized the M'Naghten rules from the time they were announced. 4
Law and lawyers in most states recognize insanity as a defense to
crime only when the accused does not have the capacity to distinguish
right from wrong, but medicine insists that a person may often know
that his conduct is forbidden by law, yet commit the crime because
of mental disease. In such cases it is extremely difficult for psychiatrists to give expert testimony. They attempt to answer a question
that the attorney has not asked them, and the attorney often gets
irritated because he cannot get the question answered that the law
requires him to ask. It has been stated that to force a psychiatrist to
speak in terms of the ability to distinguish between right and wrong
is to force him to violate the Hippocratic oath and the oath he takes
as a witness to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.22
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Lyles v. United States, 254
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Williams v. United States,
250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
20. Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
21. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §4801 (1958).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01.
Critique of Durham v. United
23. E.g., Insanity and the Criminal Law -A
States, 22 U. CH. L. REv. 317 (1955).
24. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 336-41
(1961); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REv.
325 (1955).
25. GUTrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 406-07 (1952).
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The problem of the law concerning criminal responsibility is to
determine which criminal defendants suffering from mental disease
should be subjected to a punitive-correctional disposition and which
should be disposed of by way of the medical-custodial route. Whatever test is utilized, this is the function it should perform. It should
not automatically follow that a mentally-diseased person accused of
crime should receive medical-custodial disposition solely because of
mental illness. The existence of mental disease, even when it plays
some part in the criminal act, does not necessarily solve the question.
In addition to the existence of mental disease, considerations of
social policy play a part. The psychiatrist is only competent as an
expert witness concerning the mental disease ingredient in the problem. The right and wrong test, admittedly defective, contains elements
of these nonmedical considerations, but it seems ridiculous for the law
to require medical experts to answer questions based upon it. Since
the psychiatrist cannot accurately determine the accused's capacity
to distinguish right from wrong on the basis of his expertise, his
testimony on the insanity issue may be largely conjecture and may
include his personal judgment concerning whether the defendant
ought to be punished in a prison or treated in a hospital. 26 It has
been suggested that the Durham rule only cloaks the personal moral
judgment of the psychiatrist in the disguise of expert medical testi27
mony.
Again, the cause of this misunderstanding can be found in the
differing subject matter and methods of medicine and law. It is understandable that the psychiatrist wants the accused who suffers from
mental disease to be treated in a hospital. Were no criminal act involved, everyone would agree. Law and lawyers have a more complicated problem because they must be concerned about the public as
well as the accused. Proper medical treatment for him may be highl\
improper and irresponsible treatment of the broader needs of society.
Disposition of the accused calls for a delicate balancing of many
considerations, only one of which is the existence of mental disease.
The problem is one for the law. Policy considerations are involved,
and the law represents the best compromise that social science has been
able to achieve. The fault lies with both professions, but perhaps
it rests most heavily on the legal profession for failing to explain its
problem of criminal responsibility to psychiatrists that serve as expert witnesses. When it comes to explaining a legal concept to a layman, some lawyers can be just as supercilious as some physicians when
asked to explain a medical matter. Before this particular explanation
26. Ibid.
27. McGee, Defense Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5

CATHOLIC

LA%. 35

(1959).
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can be easily made, however, the law must be clarified in most jurisdictions so that the legal test for criminal responsibility can be more
clearly articulated and so that the medical ingredient can be identified
and appropriate interrogation formulated to probe for it.
Another example of medicolegal misunderstanding is the differing
conceptions of what is meant by the word "trauma." The lawyer tends
to think of trauma as a cause of harm, while the important thing to
the physician is the effect. To the lawyer it is the application of a
physical force to the human body; to the physician it is the
resulting wound and the attendant complications. Since law and
lawyers are concerned with the economic consequences of the event,
they naturally focus attention on the physical sequence of events that
preceded the injury in order to ascertain whether it was set in motion
through some fault of the defendant. If so, then the economic loss
may be shifted to him rather than being left on the plaintiff or the
community. Medicine and the physician are not greatly concerned
about the physics of the harmful event or its economic consequences.
They are largely concerned with the wound and its sequelae; indeed,
they regard this as the trauma. A lawyer must view a traumatic injury more broadly.
This is not another attempt to explain the misunderstanding that
exists between the professions concerning causation and etiology.
The law's concept of trauma leads it to restrict liability for certain
types of injuries rather severely. The best example is liability for
negligently inflicted mental distress that later causes physical harm
without physical injury contemporaneous with the tortious conduct
of the defendant. Unless some touching of the plaintiff occurs (impact, as the courts call it), there may be no recovery for physical
harm later resulting from mental distress inflicted by the negligent
defendant. 28 This is still the law in many states, including Florida.
The law of Florida allows recovery by the plaintiff when the conduct
of the defendant is malicious or wanton, but not in a case of ordinary
negligence when the plaintiff's physical injury results from mental
20
distress without impact.
This seems strange to physicians who have no difficulty conceiving
of a traumatic event even when the body is not actually touched by
28. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 16, §37. For mental distress alone caused by
the negligent defendant without any resulting physical injury at all, either contemporaneously or subsequently, no recovery is allowed either. There is an exception covering negligent mishandling of the dead body of a relative. Annot., 12
A.L.R. 342 (1921); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Dunahoo v. Bess,
146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941). Another exception allows recovery when there is
negligence in transmitting an important message such as a death message. Annot.,
72 A.L.R. 1198 (1931); Griffith v. Shamrock Village, 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957).
29. Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
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physical force in the usual sense. Medicine has long recognized that
things which do not actually touch a person may nevertheless cause
physical harm. Extreme fright can cause very serious mental and
physical damage. Reluctance to recognize this by lawyers and judges
long resulted in no liability being imposed on a defendant that negligently caused a prenatal injury to a child.3 0 It was long felt by man)
lawyers that the breach of duty and resulting trauma occurred only
to the mother and that she, therefore, was the only person that could
recover.3 1 This was reinforced by an old legal concept, which did not
admit that a person existed or that legal wrongs could be inflicted
prior to birth. Medicine has long recognized that a child is in existence from conception.3 2 Modern medicine has done much to create
the strong trend of decisions in the other direction at the present
time, 33 but it takes the courts a long time to clean completely the
stables of the law4 Naturally, medicine is impatient and somewhat
exasperated with this delay, although some scientists practice incredulity on each other.±7
The leisurely and apathetic manner in
which the law changes to accommodate any finding of modern science
causes friction, especially since most physicians have not been trained
to understand and appreciate the function of the law as a conservator
of values and a guarantor of predictability. Stare decisis is foreign
to the man of science. It is a big thing in the law.
Injury involving medical treatment from several of the specialized
fields can cause misunderstanding between the professions. Medicine
allocates the human body to several specialty fields in order to develop
greater expertise. The neurologist is concerned with the nervous system, the orthopedist with the skeletal system. About eighteen medical
specialties are recognized, and some of them have subspecialties. The
30.
31.

(1884).
32.

PROSSER, Op. Cit. slp)a note 16, §36.
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14. 52 Am. Rep. 242

MALOY, L-.AL ANAIOMI AND SURctER

716 (2d ed. 1955);

I'ATILN, HUN I \

(2d ed. 1953).
The leading case denying recovery for physical harm resulting from negli-

EIIBRYOLOGY 181

33.

gently inflicted mental distress in the absence of impact has been recently overuled. Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961), overruling Mitchell
v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), now represents the majoriti
View. Similarly, the law in a majority of the states where the question has been
considered now permits recovery for physical harm to a fetus subsequently born
alive. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960). In this case, the court
stated that "the real catalyst of the problem is the current state of medical knowl-

edge on the point of the separate existence of a foetus."

For other cases, see

Annots., 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950), 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953).
34. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Pienatal
Injuries, 110 U. PA\. L. REV. 554 (1962).
35. Stevenson, Scientists with Half-Closed M1inds, Harper's Magazine, NO%.
1958, pp. 64-71.
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typical injury with which the lawyer is most likely to be concerned
usually cuts across these specialties, and several of them may be involved. Trauma may involve injury to bone, tissue, and nerves at
the same body situs, and this involvement is compounded when it is
recalled that a typical motor vehicle accident victim may have received traumata at several points on his body. The tendency for each
medical specialist to confine himself to his particular specialty area
may create a need for the lawyer to inform himself as to all facets of
the injuries sustained by his client. So the attorney must take a
broader approach to traumatic injury than the physician, and this is
true even of diagnosis and treatment of the injuries, the area of
medical concern. It is obvious that misunderstanding and friction can
arise out of this situation. The lawyer may feel that he has not been
fully informed by his medical experts, or the latter may feel that their
professional domain has been subjected to an unwarranted intrusion
if the attorney should try to play even a minor part in diagnosis,
treatment, and prognosis.
Many other identifiable areas of misunderstanding may be traced
to differences in subject matter and methodology. There are obvious
misunderstandings in such matters as aggravation of pre-existing conditions, the standard of care applicable to physicians, and the legal
status of treatment and procedures that are still in the experimental
stage. There is a substantial body of medical and nonmedical opinion
favorable to euthanasia, but a deliberate "mercy killing" to end life
is definitely murder as the law now stands. 36 Abortion and contraception are sites of law-medicine discord. No attempt is made here
to compile an exhaustive list.
Other basic causes may exist for the conflict between law and
medicine in addition to differences in subject matter and method.
It has been suggested that the very character of the law produces an
emotional blocking that prevents lawyers from understanding the
experimental approach of scienceA3 Some evidence indicates that the
political activity of the medical profession in this country has resulted in resentment on the part of many lawyers and laymen who
are more deeply involved in orthodox political processes and movements. 38 Further, it is common knowledge that extremely parochial
attitudes are present in both professions; neither displays a high regard for the importance of the social function of the other.
36. Fletcher, The Patient's Right to Die, Harper's Magazine, Oct. 1960, pp.
139-43; Lawson, Doctors' Dilemma, The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 27, 1962, p. 20,
cols. 4-5.
37. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 93-99 (1949).
38. "[O]rganized medicine should be bidden to stop the kind of political
activity that has resulted in the common belief that doctors are the spearhead of
the far right wing. There is potential disaster for the profession in identification
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CONCLUSION

Medicolegal relations are in need of improvement. lnterprofessional codes and impartial medical testimony plans will help to decrease surface irritations, but the basic causes of interprofessional discord require attention. The most hopeful proposal is greatly increased interprofessional education. 3 9 Medical students should be
taught something about the objectives and methods of law, and law
students should be taught something about the objectives and methods
of medicine. In 1955, a most significant article, appearing in the
American Bar Association Journal, called on the "law schools to give
a shot of medicine."'' 0 More than thirty law schools are now offering
some form of medical instruction to law students, and apparentl)
the number is increasing.41 A modest but most valuable body of
literature has recently appeared dealing with the pedagogical problems involved in such interdisciplinary education.42 The Association
of American Law Schools has created a Committee on Law and Medicine staffed by law teachers that are interested and, for the most part,
involved in medicolegal education, and the first book designed specifically for use in courses of this type was recently published. 43 Comparable data for medical schools are not at hand, but it is common
knowledge that some of the law applicable to medicine has been
taught in medical schools for many years.
The Law-Medicine program at the University of Florida was initiated after the College of Medicine was established. At the present
time, Law and Medicine, a basic course in medicine for attorneys,
is offered senior law students. A seminar is also offered dealing with
psychiatry and the law. A series of lectures dealing with the law
applicable to medicine is offered at least once a year to seniors in
the College of Medicine under the title Medical Jurisprudence. It is
quite natural and necessary that the faculties of both colleges cooperate and collaborate in offering this type of instruction. It is felt
with the ultraconservative." Beaton, A Doctor Prescribes for His Profession.
Harper's Magazine, Oct. 1960, p. 151.
39. Head, Education for the Professions in the United States-A Basic
Challenge, 10 MERCER L. REV. 263 (1959).
40. Small, Law Schools Need to Give a Shot of Medicine, 41 A.B.A.J. 693 (1955).
41. Curran, Nation-wide Survey: Medico-Legal Instruction in Law Schools, 45
A.B.A.J. 815 (1959).
42. Curran & Hamlin, The Medico-Legal Problems Seminar at Harvard Law
School, 8 J.

LEGAL

ED. 499 (1956); Farinholt, The Teaching of Medico-Legal Ma-

terials at the University of Maryland School of Law, 8 J. LEcAL ED. 508 (1956):
Ruhe & McLain, An Interprofessional Seminar at the University of Pittsburgh, 13
J. LEGAL ED. 505 (1961); Schroeder, Teaching Medico-Legal Materials: The Experience at Western Reserve University, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 503 (1956); Schwartz, Stoller &
Walters, The UCLA Medical-Legal Seminar, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 67 (1962).
43.

CURRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE (1960), 13 U. FLA. L. RFv. 252 (1960).
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that this Law-Medicine program is one of the valuable dividends
resulting from the decision to construct the Health Center at the
same location as the College of Law. Further development and growth
are expected.
Except for recent law school graduates, most practicing lawyers
have not had law-medicine training in law school. The solution for
them is the continuing-education institutes of state and local bar
groups. Teaching branches of both professions can supply some
competent teachers for such institutes, for they are acquiring a body
of experience in teaching medicine to law students and law to medical
students. Criticism that such efforts are making lawyers out of doctors
and doctors out of lawyers is ridiculous in view of the little time
that can be devoted to such education. The objective is to provide
a basis for better understanding and communication between the
professions of law and medicine. If each profession better understands the problems of the other, much of the bickering will be
avoided. 44 When physicians appreciate fully that a trial of a human
dispute is important to society, that it must occur sometime, and
that it is not calendared solely to inconvenience medical witnesses,
most of them will come to court and answer questions gracefully
though perhaps joylessly, just as Americans pay taxes. Conversely,
when the lawyer fully appreciates the many important duties his
medical witnesses have outside the courtroom, he will be more mindful of their needs.
Both medicine and law are learned professions. Each has a full
complement of brilliant men. The sooner each profession fully appreciates it has no monopoly on intellect and skill, the sooner all
will be quiet on the law-medicine front. A small dose of interprofessional education liberally sprinkled with humility should eventually bring an end to the war between the lawyers and the doctors.
This discussion of the cause and cure of the conflict between law
and medicine can be applied in a general sense to the tragic schism
between natural science and the humanities. The signs and symptoms seem to be the same. Most scientists will admit that great value
is to be found in religion, literature, history, music, philosophy, and
social science, and only a few would contend that labors in these vineyards should be less honored than scientific endeavors. Similarly
most humanists have noticed that the condition of man has been
greatly improved by the scientific revolution. Yet, there is much misunderstanding and little communication, even in universities where
the malady is generally recognized. Medicine and law provide excellent specimens for study of the schism because the area of discord
can be brought in sharper focus and because the demands of society
44.
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in the litigation of disputes involving medical aspects are forcing
physicians and attorneys into closer contact with more occasions for
friction.
Proper treatment doubtless lies in a massive program of interdisciplinary education and cross-fertilization. Interested and dedicated
scientists and humanists must begin their rapproachment. just as
physicians and lawyers must in the more restricted medicolegal schism.
Failure to bridge the gulf than now threatens the integrity of human
knowledge invites the fragmentation of civilization.'"

45. The author has written an article for a medical journal explaining law
and legal method to physicians, which also deals with the misunderstandings
that arise between the professions. Powers, The Conflict Between Lau, and Medicine, 32 Postgraduate Medicine, Oct. 1962, p. A-38.
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